








 EGALITARIAN RULES IN CLAIMS PROBLEMS 
WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS* 
 
Carmen Herrero and Ricardo Martínez** 
 




Corresponding author: Carmen Herrero, Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, 
Universidad de Alicante, Campus San Vicente de Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, E-mail: 
carmen.herrero@ua.es.  
 
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Primera Edición Mayo  2004. 
 
Depósito Legal: V-2534-2004 
 
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to 
encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific journals for their final publication. 
 
                                                 
* We acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under project 
BEC2001-0535. Financial support from Generalitat Valenciana under project GRUPOS03/086 is also gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
** C. Herrero: Ivie and Universidad de Alicante, Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, e-mail: 
carmen.herrero@ua.es; R. Martínez: Universidad de Alicante, Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, e-
mail: rmartinez@merlin.fae.ua.es. 
  
EGALITARIAN RULES IN CLAIMS PROBLEMS 
 WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS 
 







In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with 
indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an 
homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not 
enough to satisfy agents' demands. We define discrete rules to solve those problems that 
involve notions of fairness similar to those supporting the constrained-equal awards and the 
constrained-equal losses rules in the continuous case. Axiomatic characterizations of those 
solutions are provided. 
 
JEL classification numbers: D63. 
  























 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A claims problem represents a situation in which a quantity of a certain commodity has to
be distributed among some agents and the available resources fall short of total demand.
The canonical example of this kind of problems is that in which a ﬁrm goes to bankruptcy,
that is, the amount it owes to its creditors is greater than the ﬁrm’s worth. In this
problem, in general, a judge has to liquidate the ﬁrm and decide how to distribute the
amount gotten in the liquidation among the creditors. In this example, the good to be
distributed is perfectly divisible. Nonetheless, there are many claims situations involving
the distribution of a commodity coming in indivisible units.
Consider the following examples: In order to carry out the administrative tasks at
the university departments, a University contracts a certain number of secretaries. On
the one hand, this number depends on the ﬁnancial capabilities of the University. On
the other hand, each department demands, depending on its volume, a certain number of
secretaries. It happens that the total number of secretaries the departments demand is
larger than the available amount. How many secretaries correspond to each department?
Another example is the case of renting cars ﬁrms: some months the demands of new
cars from these ﬁrms to the cars manufacturer is so high that the production in that
month is not enough to satisfy the whole demand. The manufacturer must decide how
to distribute the available cars among the renting ﬁrms. Consider also the distribution of
radio frequencies among the diﬀerent broadcasting corporations, whenever there is no an
auction mechanism. If the amount of frequencies requested by the ﬁrms is too large, the
Government should decide how many frequencies are allotted to each corporation.
There is also a particular type of indivisible goods claims problems in which each
claimant demands, at most, one unit of the good. This is the case of the waiting lists at
hospitals: a certain number of patients demand an operation or transplant each, but it
is not possible to carry all the operations out, or the number of available organs is not
enough.
In claims problems, the agents are referred to as the creditors or claimants,t h ea m o u n t
to be distributed is called the estate and the creditors’ demands are called the claims.A
rule is a function that distributes the estate among the creditors according to their claims,
that is, a method to solve claims problems. The ﬁrst and fundamental approach to this
formulation is O’Neill (1982).
Traditionally, the axiomatic literature related with claims problems has focused on
situations in which the estate is either an amount of money (and then inﬁnitely divis-
ible) or an indivisible good that can be valuated in monetary terms. In the axiomatic
method characterizations of the proposed rules by using some intuitive properties are ob-
3tained. The reader is referred to the surveys by Moulin (2001) and Thomson (2003). Two
of the most well-known rules in the divisible case are the constrained-equal awards and
constrained-equal losses rules, that correspond, respectively, to the idea of equally divide
among the agents absolute awards and absolute losses. This two distinct concepts of equal-
ity have a long history and have been advocated by many authors, including Maimonides
(12 century) [Aumann and Maschler (1985)]. Characterizations of these rules appear in
Moulin (1985), Chun (1988), Young (1988), Dagan (1996), Herrero & Villar (2001) (2002),
and Yeh (2004).
Many indivisible claims problems are solved by using priority methods (see Moulin
(2000)). The use of priority orderings has also been proposed as a way of obtaining no
anonymous solutions in the continuous case. The claimants arrive one at a time and
they are fulﬁlled until the good is run out. Obviously the ﬁnal allocation depends on
the arrival order. A way of recovering anonymity consists of taking the average over all
possible arrival orders of the claimants. This procedure gives rise to the so called random
arrival solution. In the divisible goods case, the amounts recommended by the random
arrival solution can, in fact, be allotted to the claimants. In the indivisible goods case,
nonetheless, this solution only can be interpreted as an ”ex ante” solution, in expected
terms, since the ﬁnal realization is just one among the diﬀerent possible orderings. Pure
priority methods, without randomization, are normally used in the allocation of tickets,
elective surgery when there is a waiting list, or the allocation of organs in transplant
problems (see Young (1994)).
Moulin (2000) analyzes the family of rules fulﬁlling three procedural axioms: consis-
tency (with respect to variations of the set of agents), composition up and composition
down (with respect to variations of the available resources). In the continuous case, many
rules satisfy these properties, including the constrained equal awards and constrained equal
losses. Nonetheless, in the case where the commodity comes in indivisible units, the three
axioms characterize the family of priority rules, where individual demands are met lexico-
graphically according to an exogeneous ordering of the agents. That is, the combination
of the three axioms leave no room for any degree of compromise.
Nonetheless, there are natural mechanisms that allocate an approximate egalitarian di-
vision of the commodity (or, alternatively, are approximately egalitari a ni nl o s s e s ) .M o u l i n
himself (2000) mentions some of such a mechanisms: we allocate one unit of the good to
each claimant up to the moment in which the smallest claimant is fully satisﬁed; then
we continue allocating one unit of the good to each of the remaining claimants up to the
moment in which the second smallest agent is satisﬁed, an so on. Thus, at some moment,
some units are left, but we cannot allocate one unit to each of the remaining agents. What
we do then is to use a priority ordering of the agents to allocate the remaining units.
4As Moulin points out, previous mechanisms satisﬁes consistency and composition
down, but fails to satisfy composition up.
Previous family of rules (parameterized by the ordering of the set of agents) reﬂect a
notion of fairness similar to the ideas supporting, in the continuous case, the constrained-
equal awards. Similarly, another family reﬂecting the ideas of the constrained-equal losses
rules can be deﬁned.
Even though the rules in those families fail to satisfy one of the procedural axioms -
c o m p o s i t i o nu po rd o w n - ,w em a ya s ki ft h e ys t i l lf u l ﬁll some alternative properties satisﬁed
by the continuous egalitarian rules. Thus, we focus in this paper in the axiomatic analysis
of approximately egalitarian rules for the discrete claims model.
It happens that the idea of duality, and many of the properties used in the continuos
case can be translated into this setting, and many results are recovered, so that we are
able to obtain characterization results for our discrete egalitarian rules very much related
to characterization results for the egalitarian continuous rules.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we set up the claims problems
with indivisible goods and the notion of solution or rule for the continuous case and the
discrete one. In Section 3 we introduce priority orders and we use them to construct
egalitarian solutions in the discrete case. Section 4 is devoted to the properties our rules
fulﬁl. In Section 5 we present our characterization results. Section 6, with ﬁnal comment
and remarks, concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be the set of all potential agents. We denote by N the family of all ﬁnite subsets
of N. A claims problem is a tern (N,E,c),w h e r eN ∈ N, n = |N|, is a set of agents or
claimants, c ∈ Zn
+ is the vector of claims or demands1 (ci denotes the ith agent’s claim),
and E ∈ Z++ represents the estate or amount to be distributed among the agents. The
fact that the estate is not enough to satisfy the demands means that
 n
i=1 ci >E . BN
Z
denotes the set of all claims problems with the ﬁxed set of claimants N,a n dBZ represents



















i=1 ci,L = C − E
A rule is a way to distribute the estate among the agents according to their demands.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A continuous rule is a function ϕ that associates with every (N,E,c) ∈
BZ au n i q u ea l l o c a t i o nϕ(N,E,c) ∈ Rn
+ such that




The ﬁrst condition says that nobody can get neither more than she asks for nor a
negative outcome; and the second one sets that the estate is entirely distributed.
Three of the most traditional rules in the divisible good case are the proportional,
constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules. The proportional solution
distributes the estate among the claimants proportionally to their demands.
Deﬁnition 2.2 For all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ we deﬁne the continuous proportional rule as
pi(N,E,c)=λci,




The underlying idea of the constrained-equal awards rule is to treat the claimants
equally, independently of the diﬀerences in claims. All agents receive the same amount
provided that this is not higher than her claim.
Deﬁnition 2.3 For all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ we deﬁne the continuous constrained equal
awards rule as
ceai(N,E,c)=m a x {ci,λ}




6Analogously to the constrained-equal awards rule, the constrained-equal losses rule
treats claimants equally with respect to their losses, independently on the diﬀerences in
claims. Each agent should loss the same amount as the rest of the agents provided that
this amount were smaller than her claim.
Deﬁnition 2.4 For all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ we deﬁne the continuous constrained equal
losses rule as
celi(N,E,c)=m i n {0,c i − λ}




Similarly to the deﬁnition of continuous rules, we can deﬁne solutions for claims prob-
lem with indivisible goods. The diﬀerence is that now we impose the allocations to be
integer numbers.2
Deﬁnition 2.5 A discrete rule is a function Φ that associates with every (N,E,c) ∈ BZ
au n i q u ea l l o c a t i o nΦ(N,E,c) ∈ Zn
+ such that




3 σ-Discrete Egalitarian Rules
Let σ be a linear order (a complete, transitive and asymmetric binary relation) on the set
of potential agents N. We say that an agent i has priority or is preferred to another agent
j whenever iσj.W ed e n o t eb y−σ t h eo p p o s i t eo r d e r( i(−σ)j ⇔ jσi). Let Ω denote the
set of all possible linear orderings on N.
We face the problem of allocating a certain amount of an indivisible good among a set
of agents, so that the ﬁnal allocation is as egalitarian as possible. Consider the following
example: N = {x,y,z}, E =9and c =( 2 ,6,6). W es t a r tb yg i v e no n eu n i to ft h eg o o d
to each of the agents. Still no one is fully satisﬁed, and 6 units are left. We then give an
additional unit to each of the agents. Now, agent x is satisﬁed, and still 3 units are left.
We allot then one unit to each of the remaining claimants, y and z, and still 1 unit is left,
but it happens that neither x nor y are satisﬁed. The problem is now how to allocate the
remaining unit. Clearly, two options are open, either to give it to y or to z. The decision
2We use small letters for denoting the continuous rules and capital ones for the discrete case.
7of allocating this extra unit to one of the remaining agents can be made at random or
by using some idea of priority among them. Consider then a linear order σ ∈ Ω. We can
allocate the remaining unit according to σ, so that, if yσz, then it is agent y the one
enjoying the extra unit, that is, the allocation would be (2,4,3). Otherwise, it is agent z,
and then the allocation would be (2,3,4).
Previous procedure indicates that, for each linear order σ ∈ Ω, we have a particular
discrete rule. Since the rationale of all those rules is similar to that of the constrained
equal awards rule in the continuous case, we will call them all discrete constrained equal
awards rules. It is easy to see that the allocations recommended by those rules can be
obtained according to the following procedure: We may assume that the allocation process
takes place in two stages. Let (N,E,c) ∈ BZ,i nt h eﬁrst one each agent i ∈ N receives
 ceai(N,E,c)  units,3 that is, the whole part of her corresponding allocation, under the
continuous constrained equal awards rule, if the estate were completely divisible. If in this
stage some units are still left, (E  = E −
 
i∈N ceai(N,E,c)  > 0)w eg ot ot h es e c o n d
step.4
Now, we can distinguish two kinds of claimants: those who have already received an
integer amount according to cea, i.e., ceai(N,E,c) ∈ Z+ (and then  ceai(N,E,c)  =
ceai(N,E,c)); and those agents whose allocation is not an integer number. Let us denote
by Q(cea;N,E,c) this last group of agents: Q(cea;N,E,c)={j ∈ N : ceaj(N,E,c) / ∈
Z+}.L e tq = |Q(cea;N,E,c)|.
Let σ ∈ Ω. In the second stage we distribute the E  remaining units among some
agents in Q(cea;N,E,c) according to the order σ; we give one and only one unit to each
of the E  claimants with the highest priority in Q(cea;N,E,c).L e t Qσ(cea;N,E,c) be
the ordered set Q(cea;N,E,c) with the restriction of σ. W ed e n o t eb yQσ
a(cea;N,E,c)
the set of the a ﬁrst agents in Qσ(cea;N,E,c).
Thus, we may formally deﬁne, for each σ ∈ Ω,t h eσ-discrete constrained equal awards
rule as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let σ ∈ Ω.T h e n ,f o ra l l(N,E,c) ∈ BZ we deﬁne the σ-discrete con-






 ceai(N,E,c)  +1 if i ∈ Qσ
E (cea;N,E,c)
 ceai(N,E,c)  otherwise
where E  = E −
 
i∈N ceai(N,E,c)  > 0.
3For any x ∈ R+,  x  denotes the largest integer number s.t.  x ≤x.
4If no unit remains it is due to the fact that the allocation under the continuous rule is an integer share
by now.
8Similarly, we may wish to solve allocations problems of this type so that agents’ losses
are as equal as possible. Consider the following example: N = {x,y,z},c=( 2 ,4,6) and
E =5 . We now propose the following mechanism. Since the total demand is 12, and there
are only 5 units to share, agents should lose 7 units in aggregate. We start by given all
agents their full demand, and then we subtract one unit to each agent. Still the allocation
is not feasible. Thus, we take out an additional unit to each agent, so that they have
(0,2,4). Still, an additional unit should be subtracted. Since agent x has an allotment of
zero units, we cannot take out any additional unit from x. Consequently, this unit should
be subtracted either from y or from z. As before, we may choose between y and z at
random or either by using some priority order. Keeping in mind that the priority order
should favor those agents with higher priority, if yσz, then we take out the unit from z,
otherwise, it is taken out from y.
Again, for each ordering of the set of potential agents we have a diﬀerent discrete rule,
all of them sharing the rationale of the constrained equal losses rule. As before, for a
given order σ ∈ Ω, the allocation recommended by previous procedure can be obtained in
two steps. In the ﬁrst one each agent i ∈ N receives  celi(N,E,c)  units. Now, if still
some units remain (E  = E −
 
i∈N celi(N,E,c)  > 0) we go to the second step. Again,
we divide the set of claimants into two groups: those who have already obtained a whole
allocation and those who do not. Q(cel;N,E,c)={j ∈ N : celj(N,E,c) / ∈ Z+} denotes
this last subset of agents. In the second stage we distribute the E  remaining units among
some agents in Q(cel;N,E,c) a c c o r d i n gt ot h eo r d e rσ; we give one and only one unit to
each of the E  claimants with the highest priority in Q(cel;N,E,c).
As before, we may formally deﬁne, for each σ ∈ Ω,t h eσ-discrete constrained equal
losses rule as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let σ ∈ Ω.T h e n ,f o ra l l(N,E,c) ∈ BZ we deﬁne the σ-discrete con-






 celi(N,E,c)  +1 if i ∈ Qσ
E (cel;N,E,c)
 celi(N,E,c)  otherwise
where E  = E −
 
i∈N celi(N,E,c)  > 0.
Previously we stated the formal relationship between the continuos constrained equal
awards and constrained equal losses rules with our discrete versions. Consider now a
particular problem (N,E,c), involving the set of agents N. G i v e na no r d e rσ ∈ Ω, let
us call σN the restriction of σ to N. If n = |N|, there are only n! diﬀerent orders σN
on N. And thus, under the perspective of the discrete egalitarian rules described above,
there are only n! alternative recommendations to distribute E among the N claimants in
9the problem. Assume that, as in the random arrival rule, the order σN corresponds to
the arrival order of the agents, and that all orderings are equally likely. Now, for each
arrival order, we apply the discrete CEAσN (or equivalently, CELσN). Then, it turns out
that the average of the allocations obtained when the arrival orders change are simply the
allocations recommended by the continuous cea and cel rules. This result is stated in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N,E,c) ∈ BZ. For any order σN on the set of agents N,l e t
CEAσN(N,E,c) and CELσN(N,E,c) stand for the allocations recommended by the (σN)-
discrete constrained-equal awards and (σN)-discrete constrained equal losses rules respec-










(a) Let (N,E,c) ∈ BZ and i ∈ N. If the agent i is such that he receives a whole









σN∈Ω ceai(N,E,c)=ceai(N,E,c). Let us suppose then that this is not the case


















1 is the same for all the agents. Then,



























where E  = E −
 












10(b) The case of the constrained equal losses rule goes in a similar way.
Similar to the continuous case, two rules are dual rules if one of them allocates awards
in the same way the other one allocates losses.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Two discrete rules Φ and Φ∗ are dual rules if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ
Φ∗(N,E,c)=c − Φ(N,L,c)
In the continuos case, cea and cel are dual rules. Here we also obtain duality between
discrete CEA and CEL rules, but with respect to opposite orderings.
Proposition 3.2 Let σ ∈ Ω,a n dl e t−σ be the opposite ordering. Then, CEAσ and
CEL−σ are dual rules.
Proof. Let Q(cea;N,E,c) and Q(cel;N,L,c) be the sets of agents whose allocation via
cea and cel are integer numbers.5 It is easy to check that, since cea and cel are dual rules,
Q(cea;N,E,c)=Q(cel;N,E,c)= :Q,a n dt h e n ceai(N,E,c)  = ci −  celi(N,L,c)  for
all i/ ∈ Q and  ceai(N,E,c)  = ci −  celi(N,L,c) −1 for all i ∈ Q.
If we denote by E  = E −
 
i∈N ceai(N,E,c)  and L  = L −
 
i∈N celi(N,L,c)  the
remaining units, we have the following relation
E  = E −
 




i/ ∈Q ceai(N,E,c)  =
= E −
 
i∈Q (ci −  celi(N,L,c) −1) −
 
i/ ∈Q (ci −  celi(N,L,c) )=
= q − (C − E −
 
i∈N celi(N,L,c) )=
= q − L 
On the other hand Q−σ
L  = Qσ p Qσ
q−L  = Qσ p Qσ
E . Therefore, k ∈ Qσ
E  if and only if
k/ ∈ Q−σ
L  .
If k/ ∈ Q then CEAσ
k(N,E,c)=ceak(N,E,c)=ck − celk(N,L,c)=CEL−σ
k (N,L,c).
If k ∈ Q, CEAσ
k(N,E,c)= ceak(N,E,c)  +1iﬀ k ∈ Qσ
E , but we have shown above
that this happens if and only if k/ ∈ Q−σ
L  ,i ﬀ CEL−σ
k (N,L,c)= celk(N,L,c) .T h e r e f o r e
CEAσ
k(N,E,c)= ceak(N,E,c) +1 = ci− celk(N,L,c) −1+1 = ci−CEL−σ
k (N,L,c)=
 celk(N,L,c) .
5See Section 3.2 for notation
114P r o p e r t i e s
Here we look for properties our rules may fulﬁl. Some of the following properties have
been studied in the continuous case, and their rationale and appealingness are preserved
in the discrete case. In some other cases, we have to adapt the fairness principle at hand
so that it becomes meaningful in the discrete case.
The most common and appealing requirement in the continuous case is a property of
impartiality. In one if its forms, the so called equal treatment of equals, it says that in any
problem, if two claimants have identical claims, then they should receive the same amount.6
Unfortunately, no discrete rule could fulﬁll this property. It is enough to consider the case
of two agents with identical claims, and E =1 . Instead of this condition we consider a
weak version which sets that if in a problem two players have the same claims, then their
allocations diﬀer, at most, in one unit.7
Deﬁnition 4.1 Φ satisﬁes weak equal treatment if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ and all i,j ∈
N;i fci = cj,t h e n|Φi(N,E,c) − Φj(N,E,c)| ≤ 1.
We introduce now a stronger version of the above deﬁnition that also makes use of
the priority order σ. We say that a rule satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment if whenever two
claimants with the same claim are not allotted the same amount, the agent who receives
the extra unit is the one with the highest priority according to σ.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Φ satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ and all
i,j ∈ N; it happens that ci = cj implies that |Φi(N,E,c) − Φj(N,E,c)| ≤ 1,a n di f
|Φi(N,E,c) − Φj(N,E,c)| =1then Φi(N,E,c)=Φj(N,E,c)+1⇔ iσj
The next group of properties refers to changes in the estate, when the set of agents
and the claims remain ﬁxed.
The ﬁrst one is a very straightforward property, it says that if the estate increases no
agent will receive less than she got initially.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Φ satisﬁes estate monotonicity if for all (N,E,c), (N,E ,c) ∈ BZ,i f
E  ≥ E then Φ(N,E ,c) ≥ Φ(N,E,c).
6A continuous rule ϕ satisﬁes equal treatment of equals if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ and all i,j ∈ N;i f
ci = cj,t h e nϕi(N,E,c)=ϕj(N,E,c).
7This notion was introduced by Balinski & Young (1977), and they referred to that as balancedness.
12The following two properties have to do with mistakes in the estimate of the estate,
either from below or from above. Basically, they guarantee a sort of invariance in the ﬁnal
allocation, after correcting the mistakes. These two properties are of a procedural nature.
Imagine that when estimating the value of the estate, we were pessimistic, so that the
real value is larger than expected. Then two possibilities are open, either to forget about
the initial allocation and just solve the new problem, or keep the tentative allocation and
then allocate the rest of the estate among the claimants, after reducing their claims by
the amount already obtained. The property requires that the ﬁnal allocation should not
depend on this timing.
Deﬁnition 4.4 Φ satisﬁes composition up (Young, 1988) if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ
and all E1,E 2 ∈ Z++ such that E1 + E2 = E it holds that Φ(N,E1,c)+Φ(N,E2,c)=
Φ(N,E,c).
Now, suppose that, once the tentative estate has been distributed among the claimants,
it happens that it was too optimistic a estimate, so that the real value of the estate is
smaller than expected. Then we have two possibilities: the ﬁrst one is to invalidate the
allocation and make a new one with the reduced estate; the second one is to consider a
new claims problem in which the claims correspond to the tentative allocation and the
new estate is the reduced one. The next property asks these two procedures to result in
the same outcome.
Deﬁnition 4.5 Φ satisﬁes composition down (Moulin, 1987) if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ
and all E  ∈ Z+ with E  >Ethen Φ(N,E,c)=Φ(N,E,Φ(N,E ,c)).
Trivially, both composition up and composition down imply estate monotonicity.
The next group of properties are protective properties in favor of small claimants.
They refer to how small a claim should be for its owner to receive the whole claim. One
way to decide that threshold in a claims problem is the following: substitute it for the
claim of any other agents whose claim is higher, and check whether there would then be
enough to compensate everyone. The ﬁrst property exploits the idea that only claimants
responsible for the bankruptcy should be rationed.
Deﬁnition 4.6 Φ satisﬁes conditional full compensation (Herrero & Villar, 2002)
if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ,i f
 n
j=1 min{ci,c j} ≤ E then Φi(N,E,c)=ci.
The following property proposes an alternative threshold: when an individual’s claim
is smaller than the equal division of the estate, the individual should be fully compensated.
13Deﬁnition 4.7 Φ satisﬁes exemption (Herrero & Villar, 2001) if for all (N,E,c) ∈
BZ,i fci ≤  E/n  then Φi(N,E,c)=ci
Note that exemption implies conditional full compensation. Moreover, in the case of
two agents they coincide.
Similar to the previous properties, the next ones are protective properties for agents
with large enough claims. They refer to cases where agents with small enough claims
(below a certain threshold) should receive nothing, favouring large claimants. Diﬀerent
thresholds give rise to diﬀerent properties.
Deﬁnition 4.8 Φ satisﬁes conditional null compensation (Herrero & Villar, 2002)
if for all (N,E,c) ∈ BZ,i f
 n
j=1 min{ci,c j} ≤ E then Φi(N,E,c)=0 .
Deﬁnition 4.9 Φ satisﬁes exclusion (Herrero & Villar, 2001) if for all (N,E,c) ∈
BZ,i fci ≤  L/n  then Φi(N,E,c)=0
Obviously, exclusion implies conditional null compensation and in the two-agents case
they are equivalent.
Now, we consider properties that refer to changes in the set of agents. The ﬁrst
one, consistency, has been studied in a variety of models of distributive justice. Suppose
that, after solving the problem (N,E,c), a proper subset of agents S ⊂ N decides to
reallocate the total amount they have received, that is, they face a new claims problem:
(S,
 
i∈S ai,c S),w h e r ecS =( ci)i∈S and a is the allocation recommended by the rule to
the problem (N,E,c).Ar u l es a t i s ﬁes consistency if the reallocation is only a restriction
to the subset S of the initial allocation.
Deﬁnition 4.10 Φ satisﬁes consistency (Aumann & Maschler, 1985) if for all
(N,E,c) ∈ BZ,a l lS ⊂ N it holds that Φi(N,E,c)=Φi(S,
 
j∈S Φj(N,E,c),c S) ∀i ∈ S.
The next property is a sort of converse of consistency, but when we only look at
subgroups of agents of size 2. If an allocation for a problem is such that for all two-person
subgroup, the solution chooses the restriction of the allocation to the subgroup for the
associated reduced problem to this subgroup, then that allocation should be the solution
outcome for the original problem.
Let us deﬁne the set c.con(E,c;Φ)={x ∈ Zn
+ :
 
i∈N xi = E and for all S ⊂
N such that |S| =2 ,x S = Φ(
 
i∈S xi,c s)}
14Deﬁnition 4.11 Φ satisﬁes converse consistency (Chun, 1999) if for all (N,E,c) ∈
BZ, c.con(E,c;Φ)  = φ,a n di fx ∈ c.con(E,c;Φ) then x = Φ(N,E,c).
As in the continuous case, duality of properties can also be established for discrete
solutions.
Deﬁnition 4.12 We say that P∗ is dual property of P if for every rule Φ it is true that
Φ satisﬁes P if and only if its dual rule Φ∗ satisﬁes P∗
The following property is straightforward and the proof is very similar to the analogous
result in the continuous case (see Herrero & Villar, 2001).
Proposition 4.1 The following pairs of properties are dual properties:
(a) σ-weak equal treatment and (−σ)-weak equal treatment
(b) Composition up and composition down
(c) Conditional full compensation and conditional null compensation
(d) Exemption and exclusion.
Moreover, weak equal treatment, estate monotonicity, consistency and converse con-
sistency are auto-dual properties.
The next four results for the continuous case are also valid (without modiﬁcations) in
the discrete one.
Theorem 4.1 (Herrero & Villar, 2001) If a rule Φ is characterized by a set of in-
dependent properties Π = {P1,...,Pk}, and if for any Pi there exists a dual property
P∗
i , then the dual rule Φ∗ is characterized by the corresponding set of dual properties
Π∗ = {P∗
1,...,P∗
k}. Moreover, the properties in Π∗ are also independent.
Proposition 4.2 ([Elevator lemma] Thomson, 2000) If a rule Φ is bilaterally con-
sistent and coincides with a conversely consistent rule Φ  in the two agent case, then it
coincides with Φ  in general.
Proposition 4.3 (Chun, 1999) Estate monotonicity and consistency together imply con-
verse consistency.
Proposition 4.4 (Yeh, 2004) Exemption and consistency togerther imply conditional
full compensation.
155 Characterizations
We are now ready to present some characterizations results. The ﬁst one is a characteri-
zation of the σ-discrete constrained-equal awards rule.
Theorem 5.1 The σ-discrete constrained equal awards rule is the unique rule that satisﬁes
σ-weak equal treatment, conditional full compensation and composition down.
Proof. Let σ ∈ Ω. It is easy to check that the σ-discrete constrained equal awards rule
satisﬁes the three properties.
Let us prove the converse. Let us suppose that there exists a discrete rule Φ satisﬁcing
σ-weak equal treatment, conditional full compensation and composition down. Let N ∈ N
and c ∈ Zn be a vector of demands. We will show that, for any value of the estate E such
that 0 <E<C , Φ(N,E,c)=CEAσ(N,E,c).L e tu sd e ﬁne δt(c)=t.thmaxj∈N{cj}, that
is δ1(c) is the highest claim, δ2(c) is the second highest claim, and so on. Nt(c)={j ∈
N : cj = δt(c)} and nt(c)=|Nt(c)|.
Step 1. Let us suppose that E is such that C − n1(c)(δ1(c) − δ2(c)) ≤ E<C .W e c a n
distinguish two cases:
(a) If i/ ∈ N1(c),t h e nΦi(N,E,c)=ci = CEAσ
i (N,E,c) by conditional full com-
pensation.
(b) If i ∈ N1(c),b yu s i n gσ-weak equal treatment, then Φi(N,E,c)=CEAσ
i (N,E,c).






ci if i/ ∈ N1(c)
δ2(c) if i ∈ N1(c)




j. Let us suppose that E is such that C1−(n1(c)+n2(c))(δ2(c)−δ3(c)) ≤
E<C 1. We can distinguish two cases:
(a) If i/ ∈ N1(c) ∪ N2(c),t h e nΦi(N,E,c1)=ci = CEAσ
i (N,E,c1) by conditional
full compensation.










i if i/ ∈ N1(c) ∪ N2(c)
δ3(c) if i ∈ N1(c) ∪ N2(c)
By repeating this procedure we cover all the possible values for E.
Herrero & Villar (2002) show that the continuous constrained equal awards rule is the
only rule satisfying conditional full compensation and composition down. Here, unlike
the continuous case, composition down and conditional full compensation together do not
imply σ-weak equal treatment. Since this last property is directly related with the order
σ, then a natural question arises: Would it be possible to characterize the family of all
the discrete constrained-equal awards rules by using only conditional full compensation
and composition down? The answer is not. Example (5.1) shows a rule that satisﬁes
conditional full compensation and composition down that is not a member of the discrete
constrained-equal awards family.
Example 5.1 Let (N,E,c) ∈ BZ a claims problem with only two claimants, |N| =2 ,
called 1 and 2, and let σ ∈ Ω. Consider a rule that, if the claims were diﬀerent or the
estate were an even integer number, coincides with the discrete constrained-equal awards
rule for the order σ. If the claims were equal, we diﬀerentiate two cases: if the estate
were 1,5,9,13,... t h er u l ew i l la l s oc o i n c i d ew i t ht h ed i screte constrained-equal awards
rule for the order σ; otherwise, if the estate were 3,7,11,... it will coincide with the
discrete constrained-equal awards but with the opposite order (−σ).S u c har u l es a t i s ﬁes
composition down, exemption and consistency (vacuously) but there does not exist an order
σ such that it satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment.
Φ(N,E,c)=

   
   
CEAσ(N,E,c) if c1  = c2 or E ∈ {2k}k∈Z
CEAσ(N,E,c) if c1 = c2 and E ∈ {4k − 3}k∈Z
CEA−σ(N,E,c) if c1 = c2 and E ∈ {4k − 1}k∈Z
Now we have a characterization of the σ-discrete constrained-equal losses rule.
Theorem 5.2 The σ-discrete constrained equal losses rule is the unique rule that satisﬁes
σ-weak equal treatment, conditional null compensation and composition up.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to apply the results shown in Theorems (4.1) and (5.1), and Propo-
sitions (3.2) and (4.1).
17Analogously to the constrained-equal awards case, Herrero & Villar (2002) characterize
the continuous constrained-equal losses rule by using conditional null compensation and
composition up but not σ-weak equal treatment. The dual rule of that deﬁned in Example
(5.1) satisﬁes conditional null compensation and composition up but not σ-weak equal
treatment. This fact shows that it is not possible to characterize the discrete constrained
equal losses family by only using conditional null compensation and composition up.
We present now an alternative characterization of the σ-discrete constrained equal
awards rule.
Theorem 5.3 The σ-discrete constrained equal awards rule is the unique discrete rule
that satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, exemption, composition down, and consistency.
Proof. It follows inmediately from Theorem (5.1) and Proposition (4.4).
As in the previous results, Herrero & Villar (2001) prove that, in the continuous case,
the unique rule that satisﬁes composition down, exemption and consistency is the con-
strained equal awards rule. Our result is very similar to theirs adding σ-weak equal treat-
ment. Again, it is not possible to characterize the family of all the discrete constrained-
equal awards rules using the three axioms proposed by Herrero & Villar. Example (5.1)
also provides the answer.
Here we show the dual result of Theorem (5.1). It consists in a characterization of the
σ-discrete constrained equal losses rule.
Theorem 5.4 The σ-discrete constrained equal losses rule is the unique discrete rule that
satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, exclusion, composition up, and consistency.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to apply the results shown in Theorems (4.1) and (5.3), and Propo-
sitions (3.2) and (4.1).
The next characterization of the σ-discrete constrained equal awards rule is similar to
that presented in Yeh (2004).
Theorem 5.5 The σ-discrete constrained equal awards is the unique discrete rule that
satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, exemption, composition down and converse consistency.
Proof. Let σ ∈ Ω. It is easy to check that CEAσ fullﬁls the four properties, let us
see the converse. Suppose that there exists a rule Φ diﬀerent from CEAσ and which
satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, exemption, composition down and converse consistency.
Since exemption coincides with conditional full compensation in the two claimants case,
18by Theorem (5.1), Φ = CEAσ in this case. Φ fulﬁlls converse consistency, then, by using
the Elevator Lemma, Φ = CEA.
The dual result of the previous theorem provides us a new characterization of the
σ-discrete constrained-equal losses rule.
Theorem 5.6 The σ-discrete constrained equal losses is the unique discrete rule that
satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, exclusion, composition up and converse consistency.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to apply the results shown in Theorems (4.1) and (5.6), and Propo-
sitions (3.2) and (4.1)
Again, Example (5.1) shows that it is not possible to characterize the whole family
of the discrete constrained equal awards rules (discrete constrained equal losses rules) by
only using exemption, composition down and converse consistency (exclusion, composition
up and converse consistency).
The results in this section can be summarized in Table (1).
Property CEAσ CELσ
σ-weak equal treatment Y(*)(+)(-) Y(*)(+)(-)
Estate monotonicity Y Y
Composition down Y(*)(+)(-) N
Composition up N Y(*)(+)(-)
Conditional full compensation Y(+) N
Exemption Y(*)(-) N
Conditional null compensation N Y(+)
Exclusion N Y(*)(-)
Consistency Y(*) Y(*)
Converse consistency Y(-) Y(-)
Table 1: This table summarizes the result in former sections; "Y" means that
t h er u l es a t i s ﬁes that property while "N" that it does not. On the other hand
Y(*) (respectively Y(+) and Y(-))means that this property, together with the
others marked with (*) ((+),(-)) in the same column, characterize the rule.
5.1 Independence of Properties
The characterizations in Theorems (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6)are tight. We
here prove the independence of the properties.
19Example 5.2 Ar u l e ,Φσ, that satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, conditional full com-
pensation, exemption, consistency, converse consitency and that no satisﬁes composition
down can be described as follows: First, let us suppose that the estate were completely
divisible; then start by dividing the estate among the agents with the lowest claims, up
to the moment in which those agents are satiated; then, if there is still some estate left,
divide it equally among agents with the second lowest claim, and so on. Formally, let
(E,c) ∈ BN,l e tµ1(c)=m i n j∈N{cj}, M1(c)={j ∈ N : µ1(c)=cj}, m1(c)=|M1(c)|,
µ2(c)=m i n j∈NpM1(c){cj}, M2(c)={j ∈ N : µ2(c)=cj}, m2(c)=|M2(c)|,e t c .T h e n
for each j ∈ Mk(c)
ϕj(E,c)=

   
   



















 ϕj(N,E,c)  +1 if j ∈ Qσ
E (ϕ;N,E,c)
 ϕj(N,E,c)  otherwise
where E  = E −
 
i∈N ϕi(N,E,c)  > 0.
Example 5.3 Ar u l et h a ts a t i s ﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, exemption, composition down,




σ(N,E,c) if |N| =3and for each pair {i,j} ∈ N, ci  = cj
CEAσ(E,c) otherwise
where Φ






































 ϕj(N,E,c)  +1 if j ∈ Qσ
E (ϕ;N,E,c)
 ϕj(N,E,c)  otherwise
where E  = E −
 
i∈N ϕi(N,E,c)  > 0.
201. The rule Φ∗ is deﬁned by the previous algorithm. Imagine that the set of players is
ordered in this way {n,n−1,...,1}, if we take the problem E =1 0and c =( 2 ,6,8),
Φ∗(E,c)=( 2 ,3,5);w h i l ef o rS = {2,3}, cS =( 6 ,8), Φ∗(3 + 5,c s)=( 4 ,4).
Example 5.4 Similar to the discrete constrained equal awards and losses rules, we can






 pj(N,E,c)  +1 if j ∈ Qσ
E (p;N,E,c)
 pj(N,E,c)  otherwise
where E  = E −
 
i∈N pi(N,E,c)  > 0,a n dp denotes the continuous proportional rule.
This σ-discrete proportional rule satisﬁes σ-weak equal treatment, composition down, con-
sistency and converse consistency but it violates exemption and conditional full compen-
sation.
Example 5.5 CEA−σ satisﬁes exemption, composition down, conditional full compensa-
tion, and consistency but not σ-weak equal treatment.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this work we have considered claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems
in which the estate, the claims and the allocations are indivisible units of an homogeneous
good. If the three procedural properties consistency, composition up and composition down
are requested, only pure priority rules are left, leaving no room for any sort of compromise.
Nonetheless, it is possible to construct approximately egalitarian rules to solve this types
of problems. That is, rules that allocate either awards or losses in a way so that they
are as equal as possible among the agents. When indivisible goods are involved, those
egalitarian procedures give rise to multiplicity of allocations, unless we state some priority
order among the agents. We do so, and use the priority order only to allocate the ”extra”
units, that is, those units that are left after applying our egalitarian principle as far as
possible. This order is exogenously given, and it can be chosen either at random or by using
any sort of priority principle. By using this method, we construct discrete rules that very
much share the spirit of the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules
for the continuous case. A family of rules is obtained in either case, one rule for each linear
order on the set of agents. It happens that for every problem, the allocation recommended
by the corresponding continuous rule is the average of the allocations recommended for
all the discrete rules, for the diﬀerent orders.
Many of the properties of the continuous case can be extended to the discrete one, as
21the idea of duality, that also works in this context. Any discrete constrained equal awards
rule is the dual rule of the constrained equal losses rule, under opposite orders.
Even though our discrete rules do not satisfy simultaneously the procedural properties
of composition up and composition down, they fulﬁll one of them each, as well as many
other properties used in the literature for the continuous case. Thus, we obtained char-
acterization results for our rules by using properties very much related to those used in
the continuous case. The main diﬀerence now is that pure anonymity principles cannot be
fulﬁlled for our rules, and thus, we consider some related properties, stating that when two
agents have identical claims, their awards are equal or else diﬀer in one unit. Furthermore,
if two agents with identical claims do not receive the same awards, then the one with the
highest award goes ﬁrst in the priority order. Our characterization results are similar to
those in Herrero & Villar (2001, 2002) and Yeh (2003) for the continuous case, by adding
the aforementioned relaxation of equal treatment of equals. Unlike the continuous case,
now this ”impartiality property” is necessary to get a characterization.
Theorem 5.3 is related to Theorem 1, page 175 in Young (1994). Consider the case
where each agent demands at most one unit of the indivisible commodity. Then, it happens
that consistency implies composition down, and exemption is vacuously fulﬁlled. Further-
more, for this particular case, the σ-discrete constrained equal awards rule coincides with
t h ep r i o r i t yr u l ed e ﬁned by the ordering σ. Therefore, Theorem 5.3 simply says that a rule
satisﬁes consistency and σ-weak equal treatment iﬀ it is the σ-priority rule.
Our discrete extensions are also related to the continuous rules in a diﬀerent way.
We may consider a two step procedure to allocate awards. Given a problem, in the ﬁrst
step, we allocate to every agent the whole part of her allocation under the cea (or the
cel) rule. Then we allocate the remaining units according to the priority order. Previous
two-step procedure can be also used in order to deﬁne some other types of discrete rules,
by considering, at the ﬁrst step, any continuous rule. Hence, for each continuous rule
we get a family of discrete associated rules. Even though theoretically, the application
of this procedure gives rise to new discrete rules, not in all cases the rules obtained are
natural and well-behaved (see Example 5.4). This happens, in particular with respect
to the proportional solution. Thus, further research is needed in order to provide with
alternative discrete rules.
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